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SUMMARY
There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a 
nuclear strike. In the Cold War, the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation 
necessitated procedures emphasizing speed and efficiency and placing sole 
decision-making authority in the president’s hands. In today’s changed 
threat environment, the legal authorities and process a U.S. president would 
confront when making this grave decision merit reexamination. This paper 
serves as a resource in the national discussion about a president’s legal 
authority and the procedures for ordering a nuclear strike, and whether to 
update them. 
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Executive Summary
There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. The U.S. government grappled with the process for making that decision during the decades of the Cold War. 
The threat of sudden nuclear annihilation by the Soviet Union shaped the resulting procedures, which 
emphasize speed and efficiency and which place sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands. 
Today we face a different threat environment, but tensions remain between states with nuclear weapons. 
As a result, public and congressional attention has focused on the legal authorities and limitations, as well 
as the process, that a U.S. president would confront when making the grave decision of whether to use a 
nuclear weapon. It is a complex subject, and few sources address it clearly and 
simply. This paper seeks to fill that gap by identifying the key legal questions 
relevant to a president’s decision and by summarizing the state of the law and the 
relevant process.
Currently, neither domestic nor international law specifically addresses the 
authority to use nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, because of the devastating 
potential of those weapons, existing authorities relating to use of force generally 
may apply differently to nuclear weapons than to other weapons. The paper looks 
first at U.S. domestic law, including the Constitution and statutes, and examines 
the respective powers of the president and Congress in decisions about the use 
of nuclear weapons. The Constitution’s division of war powers between the 
executive and legislative branches is notoriously murky. Congressional authority 
might act in two ways to restrict a president’s decision to use nuclear weapons: 
(1) if the president is required to seek congressional authorization before use, and 
(2) if a statute prohibits or limits certain uses of those weapons. Regarding the first, there is little question 
that a president has the authority to respond in self-defense against a nuclear attack without seeking prior 
authorization. The more difficult question arises when a president plans a first use of nuclear weapons. There 
is a strong argument that if a president contemplates a first use of nuclear weapons to preempt a perceived 
nuclear threat before the threat has developed to the point at which an attack has begun or is imminent, he 
must first seek authorization from Congress. The legal conclusion might be different, however, if the first 
use is in response to a conventional attack on the United States or in the course of a conventional armed 
conflict. 
Like questions about authorization, the extent of Congress’s power to limit by statute a president’s authority 
to use nuclear weapons is controversial. Congress clearly has some power to affect a president’s decision-
making in this area, if it chooses to act. Most experts agree that Congress’s various war powers would allow 
it to prevent entirely the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Congress could also deny funding for 
weapons through its appropriations power. Congress’s broad authorities to establish and regulate armies 
and a navy also include some power to restrict presidential decision-making about when and how to use 
nuclear weapons, but how much is not clear. The closer congressional action comes to micromanaging 
tactical “battlefield” decisions, the more likely it is to run afoul of the president’s authority as commander 
in chief. 
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The paper next examines international law and how it may act to limit a president’s options in using 
nuclear force. The United Nations (UN) Charter would prohibit any use of force, including nuclear force, 
in the territory of another state unless the state consents, the UN Security Council authorizes the force, 
or the force is in self-defense against an actual or imminent armed attack. In addition, for a use of nuclear 
force to be legal, it must satisfy customary ad bellum international law requirements of necessity and 
proportionality. The proportionality principle is likely to be a challenge for any first use of nuclear weapons 
in self-defense because of the enormous destructive power of those weapons. International humanitarian 
law (IHL) regulates the means and methods used in conflict and balances the two fundamental principles 
of humanity and military necessity. The principle of humanity includes three 
key requirements: distinction, proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering. Each of these requirements presents a very significant legal hurdle for 
the use of nuclear weapons. 
Last, the paper examines—to the extent possible in an unclassified source—
the current executive branch process for decisions about nuclear launch, the 
opportunities those procedures afford for a president to receive legal advice, 
and possible protections against an illegal nuclear strike order. The policies and 
procedures by which the United States may employ nuclear weapons are designed 
to ensure that, if deterrence fails, the United States has the capability to respond 
effectively with nuclear weapons. The process for nuclear launch decisions 
includes extensive contingency planning in peacetime that provides a president 
with a range of options that have been debated and reviewed in advance, including 
by lawyers. Before any actual decision to launch, the president has an opportunity 
to consult with advisers, including his lawyers, although there is no requirement 
that he do so. The final decision to launch is the president’s alone. Once a president 
makes this decision, the order goes to an Emergency Action Team at the Pentagon 
and a structured and automatic process begins, with limited flexibility for the 
actors in that process to raise legal concerns.
Because a president’s order to launch nuclear weapons could violate U.S. 
or international law, an important question is whether there are sufficient 
opportunities to guard against an illegal order. The process provides some 
opportunities, but there are no guarantees. As noted, there is legal review of the 
predeveloped or preplanned options presented to the president for decision. This review focuses on IHL 
issues and can eliminate options that are illegal under any circumstance, but it does not address fully the 
constitutional, ad bellum, or other legal issues that rely on an understanding of the specific context and 
circumstances of a potential strike. A president may seek additional legal advice before a decision to launch; 
this would often happen as part of the traditional National Security Council process. A president may 
choose to truncate that process, however, or even dispense with it altogether. 
With respect to the question of whether and how an illegal order to launch nuclear weapons could be 
impeded, there are two possible mechanisms. One is the obligation for members of the armed forces to 
refuse unlawful orders, and the other is the process set out in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution for transfer of power in the event of a president’s disability. Both are difficult and of limited 
use in this context. After the president makes a launch decision, a member of the Emergency Action Team 
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responsible for implementation may raise concerns that the order is unlawful. Members of the armed forces 
are obligated to refuse orders that are “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. This is a strict standard, however, 
and the legal issues involved are complex and fact dependent. The automatic nature of the post-decision 
process for implementing a launch order could make it difficult for military personnel to seek and receive 
adequate advice in the time available. 
The second mechanism—the Twenty-Fifth Amendment procedures—involves several steps, including the 
vice president seeking a vote of principal Cabinet members, notification to Congress, an opportunity for 
the president to reverse the transfer, a second cabinet vote and congressional notification, and a vote of 
both houses of Congress. The process is time consuming, but it does, in principle, provide a possible route 
to transfer of power in the extreme case in which an infirm president is determined to move forward with 
what the president’s cabinet judges to be a reckless or illegal nuclear strike. 
This paper illuminates but does not attempt to provide authoritative answers to the many complex and 
contested legal issues that accompany decisions about the use of nuclear force. It identifies some limitations 
on a president’s actions and potential shortcomings in the existing process. Its primary purpose, however, is 
to highlight key issues, summarize the various viewpoints, and provide some practical insight into how legal 
questions may arise and whether and how they can affect decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons. 
This paper is intended to serve as a resource in the national discussion pertaining to the authority and 
procedures of a president to order a nuclear launch, and potential options for updating that authority and 
those procedures. 
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Introduction
There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. The U.S. government grappled with the process for making that decision during the decades of the Cold War. 
The threat of sudden nuclear annihilation by the Soviet Union shaped the resulting procedures, which 
emphasize speed and efficiency and which place sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands. 
Today we face a different threat environment, but tensions remain between states with nuclear weapons. 
As a result, public and congressional attention has focused on the legal authorities and limitations, as well 
as the process, that a U.S. president would confront when making the grave decision of whether to use a 
nuclear weapon. It is a complex subject, and few sources address it clearly and simply.
This paper seeks to fill that gap by identifying the key legal questions and 
summarizing the state of the law. It first discusses U.S. law—the Constitution and 
statutes—and examines the respective powers of the president and Congress in 
decisions about the use of nuclear weapons. The paper next looks at international 
law and how it may act to limit a president’s options for using nuclear force. Finally, 
it examines the current executive branch process for decisions about nuclear 
launch, the opportunities those procedures afford for providing legal advice, and 
possible protections against an illegal nuclear strike order. 
The paper does not attempt to provide authoritative answers to the many complex 
and contested legal issues that accompany decisions about nuclear force. It does 
identify some limitations on a president’s actions and potential shortcomings in 
the existing process. Its primary purpose, however, is to highlight key issues, to 
summarize the various viewpoints, and to provide some practical insight into 
how legal questions may arise and whether and how they can affect decisions.
Does U.S. Law Limit the President’s Decision to Use 
Nuclear Weapons?
The U.S. Constitution’s division of war powers between the executive 
and legislative branches is notoriously murky. Few areas of law are 
more debated and less settled. The Constitution confers significant authority on each branch, but 
the exact scope of those authorities and the ways in which they interact remain controversial. 
Congressional authority might act in two principal ways to restrict a president’s decision to use 
nuclear weapons: (1) if the president is required to seek congressional authorization before use, and 
(2) if a statute prohibits or limits certain uses of those weapons. 
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Constitutional War Powers: Background
As part of an attempt to create structural checks on the power of each coequal branch of government, the 
Founders granted war power authority to both the executive and legislative branches. The Constitution’s 
grants of authority to Congress to “declare War,”1 to “raise and support Armies,”2 to “provide and maintain 
a Navy,” 3 and to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”4 among 
others—as well as Congress’s power over appropriations,5 including for the national defense and foreign 
affairs—collectively provide significant power over the military and foreign affairs.6 
There is wide—although not universal—agreement among constitutional scholars and practitioners that 
the power to “declare War” was intended to (and still does) require congressional authorization for some 
conflicts.7 Those experts just disagree about the kinds of conflicts8 and the degree of control this authority 
gives Congress over the conduct of those conflicts.9 Contemporary understandings of the “declare War” 
clause generally deem an authorization for the use of military force or other 
statutory authorization to be an acceptable mechanism for Congress to exercise 
its authority and do not require a formal declaration of war.10 The powers to 
“raise and support Armies,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land and naval Forces,” and “provide and maintain a Navy,” some scholars 
argue, necessarily include the lesser authority to regulate or restrict the weapons 
those military services may use.11 Finally, the appropriations power can be used 
to impose meaningful limitations on the conduct of military action. The most 
significant use of the “power of the purse” to limit the military was the 1973 
prohibition of use of appropriations to support combat activities in Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos.12 Congress could also use its appropriations power to slow 
or halt the development of new nuclear capabilities, to limit nuclear explosive 
testing, to limit the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenal, or to reduce the 
size of the nuclear force.13
The president’s principal war power derives from Article II’s instruction that the 
“President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, 
and of the Militia of the several States.”14 As commander in chief, the president has 
“command of the forces and the conduct of military campaigns.”15 This is widely 
understood to confer on the president alone the authority to command forces and 
direct the conduct of military campaigns through “battlefield decisions.”16 
Scholars—and, to a lesser degree, courts—have grappled throughout U.S. history with how these grants of 
authority interact. There is general agreement that the president’s war powers have expanded, in practice, 
since World War II.17 There are many explanations for this expansion.18 Even so, the degree of this shift is 
not clear, and most would agree that Congress maintains significant authority. 
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Is Congressional Authorization Required for Use of Nuclear Weapons?
All but those with the most executive-favoring view of war powers19 would agree that some circumstances 
exist under which Congress’s war powers require the president to obtain congressional authorization before 
taking military action. The question, then, is: when does a president’s plan to use a nuclear weapon trigger 
this requirement? 
There are two relevant scenarios to consider: (1) a scenario in which a president 
plans to use a nuclear weapon in self-defense against a nuclear attack, and (2) a 
U.S. “first use” of nuclear weapons.20 The latter scenario is the more complicated, 
and there is a strong argument that the president would be required to seek 
congressional authorization in some first-use scenarios.
Self-Defense against Nuclear Attack
The president has the authority, on his own initiative, to use force in self-defense 
to repel an attack on the United States. This was the Supreme Court’s holding 
in the Prize Cases.21 In that Civil War–era opinion, the court held that no prior 
declaration of war was required before President Lincoln blockaded Southern 
ports in response to a Confederate use of force. The court concluded that “the 
President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not 
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special 
legislative authority.”22 This presidential authority to act unilaterally in the face of 
an attack is widely accepted.23 A nuclear attack on the United States represents 
one of the gravest threats imaginable. The president would need to act quickly 
and decisively. There is little doubt of his authority under those circumstances to 
respond with nuclear force without seeking prior authorization from Congress.
First Use of Nuclear Weapons
A more difficult question arises when a president plans a first use of nuclear 
weapons.24 First-use scenarios fall into two broad categories, although there 
are variations within each category: (1) a first use of nuclear weapons intended, 
perhaps, to address a perceived nuclear threat but launched before that threat 
has developed to the point at which a nuclear attack has begun or is imminent, 
and (2) a first use in response to a conventional attack or during a conventional armed conflict. In the first 
scenario, the argument that prior congressional authorization would be required is stronger. 
First Use in the Absence of Conflict or Attack. There is a long history of presidents using conventional 
force without congressional authorization and not in response to an attack on the United States. Most 
notably, President Harry S. Truman never sought or received authorization for U.S. involvement in the 
Korean War, a conflict that lasted longer than three years.25 Executive branch precedent since that time, 
however, generally supports the view that Truman’s actions were not constitutional and that congressional 
approval was required.26
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More common have been presidential commitments of troops or uses of force in more limited circumstances 
without congressional sanction.27 Two recent examples of this type of deployment are (1) the Obama 
administration’s participation in a 2011 allied military air operation in Libya in reaction to fears of an 
impending massacre by the al-Gaddafi regime28 and (2) the Trump administration’s strikes in Syria in 
response to the Assad government’s use of chemical weapons on its own citizens.29 In both circumstances, 
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice—the office that provides definitive legal 
advice for the executive branch—advised the president that congressional authorization was not required 
before using force.30
OLC engages in two inquiries in determining whether using force without congressional authorization, and 
in the absence of an attack, is appropriate: (1) whether the president can find that the proposed operations 
further “important national interests,” and (2) whether the “anticipated nature, scope, and duration” of the 
anticipated conflict “constitutes a ‘war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of War clause.”31 Presumably, 
any president contemplating the use of a nuclear weapon will be able to articulate a satisfactory national 
interest in doing so. It will be a greater hurdle, however, to demonstrate that the 
planned engagement does not constitute a “war” in the constitutional sense. 
In its Libya and Syria opinions, OLC emphasizes the “limited means, objectives, 
and intended duration”32 of the planned operations and the “efforts to avoid 
escalation”33 to illustrate that the conflict falls short of “war.” OLC identifies the type 
of engagement that would trigger a requirement for congressional authorization 
as one involving “prolonged and substantial” military actions that typically would 
involve “exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial 
period.”34 Among the considerations deemed relevant is whether U.S. forces are 
“likely to ‘suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.’”35 
Any analysis of these issues is highly fact dependent, but it is unlikely that a 
proposed first-use nuclear strike would be “limited” in “means, objectives, and 
intended duration.” Casualties would likely be massive and the risk of escalation great.36 In applying the 
executive branch’s own legal analysis, then, a proposed first use of nuclear weapons when the United States 
has neither been attacked nor is engaged in an authorized conflict would likely be considered a “war” for 
purposes of the “declare War” clause and would require prior authorization. 
First Use Following a Conventional Strike or During Conventional Armed Conflict. The legal question 
could change if a first use of nuclear weapons is in response to a conventional attack on the United States 
or during an ongoing conventional armed conflict. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has held 
that the president is not required to seek authorization when responding in self-defense.37 The president’s 
powers may also be greater when the country is engaged in armed conflict, particularly if it is an authorized 
conflict. Some have suggested that a nuclear response to a conventional provocation or conflict is so 
sharply escalatory that it “arguably initiates a new and dangerously more threatening war” and therefore 
requires congressional approval even if the president is acting in self-defense or the country is engaged in an 
authorized armed conflict, which the president seeks to escalate.38 Throughout much of the Cold War, U.S. 
policy held that the response to a large-scale Soviet conventional attack would be nuclear use.39 Although 
the policy was silent on whether Congress would authorize that response, this does suggest that the U.S. 
Government at that time did not share the view that a nuclear response would initiate a new conflict. Given 
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that precedent, the president’s lawyers would probably conclude that he has the authority to respond with 
nuclear force on his own initiative, particularly if a rapid response is needed. 
Practical Challenges: Enforcement and Accountability
As discussed, there are at least some scenarios in which a president should obtain congressional approval 
before engaging in a first use of nuclear weapons. It is not clear, however, how much this legal requirement 
would, as a practical matter, limit presidential action because there is no 
mechanism to enforce it. There is little chance that the courts would act on the 
issue, because they are notoriously reluctant to involve themselves in war powers 
disputes.40 Increasingly, Congress is also reluctant to assert itself on matters of war 
and peace.41
There are many strong legal, political, and governance arguments for obtaining 
congressional authorization before using a nuclear weapon. But for a president 
unmoved by those arguments, the improbability of court or congressional 
intervention removes a powerful motivation to obtain authorization. Unless 
public pressure provides a different incentive, the Constitution’s requirement of 
prior authorization may have little practical effect.
May Congress Limit or Prohibit Use of Nuclear Weapons?
Currently, no statute limits or regulates the president’s authority to use nuclear 
weapons. Bills on the subject have been introduced and debated over the decades, 
however,42 and congressional interest has increased recently.43 Like questions 
about authorization, the extent of Congress’s authority to pass such a statute is 
controversial, although Congress certainly has some power to affect the president’s 
decision-making in this area if it chooses to act. 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court and lower courts, when 
considering the interplay of executive and legislative powers, have looked to 
Justice Robert H. Jackson’s analysis in the 1952 case Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer.44 In that case, which considered President Truman’s seizure of 
steel production facilities during the Korean War, Justice Jackson explained that 
the president’s powers generally “are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon 
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”45 Thus, the president’s 
flexibility to act in areas such as this one, in which both branches possess authority, 
depends in part on whether Congress has spoken on the issue. When the president 
acts in a way that is consistent with an express or implied authorization by Congress, “his authority is at its 
maximum.”46 When Congress has been silent on an issue, the president may rely only on his own powers, 
but there is a “zone of twilight”47 in which the distribution of powers is uncertain and congressional inertia 
can enable presidential action. When the president acts in a way that is incompatible with the express or 
implied will of Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb” and he can act only when his power is “exclusive” 
and “so conclusive and preclusive” that it is “beyond control by Congress.”48 
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As discussed, the precise limits of congressional and executive war powers authority are a source of 
continual debate.49 Some things are fairly clear. Congress’s power to “raise and support Armies,” “provide 
and maintain a Navy,” and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” 
would allow Congress to remove nuclear weapons from the U.S. arsenal. Congress could also deny funding 
for the weapons.50 The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress has some authority to constrain 
the president’s activities during wartime,51 although the degree of that authority remains unclear. Most 
experts would agree that if Congress attempted to legislate specific tactical moves in battle or to issue orders 
directly to the president’s subordinates, that would intrude impermissibly on 
“exclusive” presidential authority.52 How far this goes is less clear. Some argue 
that a choice of which weapon to employ—once that weapon is in the arsenal—is, 
similarly, an exclusive presidential authority on which Congress cannot intrude.53 
Others say that Congress’s powers to establish and regulate armies and a navy, 
as well as to cut off funds for nuclear weapons entirely, necessarily include the 
authority to place restrictions on the president’s decision-making with respect to 
the use of those weapons.54
Assuming that Congress possesses some authority to limit the president’s 
ability to use nuclear weapons, the next question is what types of restrictions 
are most likely to survive scrutiny—either by the courts (although court review 
is quite unlikely),55 or by the executive branch.56 The closer a statute comes to 
micromanaging tactical “battlefield” decisions, the more problematic it becomes. 
Some possible actions include the following.
Limitation by Statute of First Use of Nuclear Weapons. Legislation proposed in 
the 115th Congress would restrict the president’s ability, on his own, to order a 
“first-use nuclear strike,” defined as an “attack using nuclear weapons against an 
enemy that is conducted without the president determining that the enemy has 
first launched a nuclear strike against” the United States or its allies.57 The proposal 
does not prohibit first use or declare a policy against it, but it asserts Congress’s role in the decision-making 
process by stating that such a strike would violate the Constitution unless Congress had first passed a 
declaration of war that “expressly authorizes” a nuclear strike.58 Congress has considered similar legislation 
in the past.59 
There is a strong argument, articulated in the previous section, that such a proposal is within Congress’s power. 
Unlike a prohibition, it would not take a military option off the table. Instead, it asserts a congressional role 
in this highly consequential national security decision. Nonetheless, this claim of congressional authority 
could be controversial within the executive branch, making it likely that the legislation would prompt a 
veto. 
Limitations as Part of a Force Authorization. A similar but more targeted option would be for Congress—
in the process of authorizing a conventional conflict—to limit the use of nuclear weapons in that conflict. 
For example, Congress might clarify that first use of nuclear weapons would require separate authorization. 
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may limit the scope and targets of a conflict it has authorized.60 
On many occasions throughout U.S. history, Congress has authorized the use of force but placed limitations 
on how that force may be employed,61 including by identifying permissible targets,62 by specifying which 
military service could be used,63 and by limiting the geographic or temporal scope of the conflict.64 There 
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does not appear to be an example of Congress restricting the type of weapon that the president may use, 
but an argument can be made that such a restriction does not differ in relevant ways from those precedents. 
Such an approach might be less likely to invite a veto than a statute limiting the first use of nuclear weapons 
because the president would presumably want the underlying authorization. The approach would not be 
without its detractors, however. Some would argue, for example, that it undermines deterrence to take 
nuclear weapons off the table. In addition, limitations on authorization in the 
context of an ongoing conflict could prove politically difficult for members of 
Congress. 
Imposing Procedural Requirements for a First-Use Decision. A more limited 
but perhaps more realistic recent proposal would not seek to insert Congress into 
the president’s decision-making process for the first use of nuclear weapons but 
would strengthen that process within the executive branch.65 Such a proposal 
reflects the concern, discussed in Section III, that there are inadequate mechanisms 
to ensure that the president receives responsible advice and considers all relevant 
factors in a decision about first use of nuclear weapons.66 Possible procedural 
protections could include a requirement that the secretary of defense certify that 
the launch order is valid—that is, that it comes from the commander in chief—
and that the attorney general (or designee) be included in the decision process 
and confirm that the order is legal.67
Although those requirements, if imposed by Congress,68 would no doubt generate 
some constitutional concerns, they are far less intrusive on presidential authorities 
than the other alternatives discussed. Those who seek congressional input on 
these decisions will not find this approach as satisfying as the options previously 
discussed, but it is less likely to prompt a veto or other negative executive branch 
action and thus stands a better chance of becoming law.69
Does International Law Limit the President’s 
Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons?
International laws related to conflict—including the UN Charter, the Geneva 
Conventions, and other treaty and customary international laws—operate 
differently from domestic law found in the U.S. Constitution and statutes. They 
can nonetheless act to constrain a president’s decision-making related to the use 
of nuclear weapons.70
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, 
concluded that “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and 
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.”71 The court emphasized, however, that 
any use of force by means of nuclear weapons must comply with the UN Charter and its provisions related 
to the use of force as well as with the principles of international humanitarian law and other international 
laws related to conflict.72 As discussed in more detail in Section II.b, the court concluded that “the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary” to international law related to conflict, particularly 
International laws 
related to conflict—
including the UN 
Charter, the Geneva 
Conventions, 
and other treaty 
and customary 
international laws—
operate differently 
from domestic 
law found in the 
U.S. Constitution 
and statutes. They 
can nonetheless 
act to constrain a 
president’s decision-
making related to 
the use of nuclear 
weapons.
NTI Paper 11 www.nti.org
The President and Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, and Process
IHL, but it could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful 
or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at 
stake.”73
Some Uses of Nuclear Weapons Could Violate the UN Charter and Jus Ad Bellum 
Principles of International Law
Although the use of nuclear weapons is not per se prohibited under international 
law, there are a variety of ways in which a nuclear strike—particularly a first use 
of nuclear weapons—could violate specific international law requirements. For 
example, using force with a nuclear weapon—or any other weapon—could violate 
the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force in the territory of another state 
unless it met the requirements for one of the exceptions to that prohibition.74 One 
exception, found in Article 51 of the charter, permits a use of force in self-defense 
against an armed attack.75 Thus, a military strike, using a nuclear weapon or any 
other weapon, would be illegal if the United States had not suffered an armed 
attack.76 A state need not wait until an armed attack has occurred to respond in self-
defense, but can act in anticipatory self-defense if an armed attack is “imminent.”77 
What qualifies as an imminent attack is the subject of some disagreement among 
nations and legal experts. A preventive strike—that is, one against a prospective 
attacker that has the capability to strike but is neither planning nor preparing to do 
so—would not be a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense.78 It is the position 
of the U.S. government that the imminence standard is not solely a question of 
temporal proximity, but can be based on other circumstances. For example, the 
United States might consider an armed attack to be imminent, even if it is not 
expected immediately, when the attacker is clearly committed to the attack and 
failing to act promptly would result in the loss of the opportunity to take effective 
action in self-defense.79
For a use of force in self-defense to be legal, it also must satisfy customary 
international law requirements of necessity and proportionality.80 The necessity 
requirement in this context requires an assessment of whether force in a non-
consenting state is necessary to address the threat or whether other measures 
short of force—law enforcement or diplomacy, for example—would suffice.81 The proportionality principle 
examines the type of force employed to determine whether the damage it will cause—including to innocent 
civilians—is more than what is needed to prevent or repel an armed attack. Although these assessments 
are highly fact dependent, the proportionality principle is likely to be a challenge for any use of a nuclear 
weapon in self-defense because of the massive human and environmental destruction that those weapons 
cause and the inevitable impact on civilians. 
Many Uses of Nuclear Weapons Would Violate International Humanitarian Law
IHL, also known as the law of armed conflict and the jus in bello, does not focus on the justness of a conflict 
or on how the parties came to be fighting. IHL is about the means and methods used in conflict and how 
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the law applies to control their use. IHL balances the two fundamental principles of humanity and military 
necessity. The International Committee of the Red Cross describes the balance this way:
IHL is a compromise between two underlying principles, of humanity and of military 
necessity. . . . The principle of military necessity permits only that degree and kind of 
force required to achieve the legitimate purpose of a conflict, i.e. the complete or partial 
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of 
life and resources. It does not, however, permit the taking of measures that would otherwise 
be prohibited under IHL. The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of all suffering, 
injury or destruction not necessary for achieving the legitimate purpose of a conflict.82
The principle of humanity includes three key requirements: distinction, 
proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary suffering. Use of a nuclear weapon, 
assuming it can satisfy the requirements of the military necessity principle, would 
not be permitted if it otherwise violates IHL. As the ICJ Advisory Opinion 
points out, use of nuclear weapons runs a very high risk of violating IHL because 
each of the key requirements of the humanity principle raises high, perhaps 
insurmountable, legal hurdles.83 
Distinction Requirement. The principle of distinction protects civilians not 
taking part in hostilities by requiring parties to the conflict to “distinguish 
between civilian objects and military objectives and . . . direct their operations 
only against military objectives.”84 Parties are not permitted to target civilian 
populations.85 A related principle prohibits the use of weapons that are, by their 
nature, indiscriminate—that is, those “of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”86 
Some argue that nuclear weapons, with their massive blasts and the even larger 
radius in which radiation would be released, are by their nature indiscriminate 
because it is impossible to distinguish between military objectives and civilians 
in their use. According to this argument, a nuclear strike would always violate 
the distinction requirement.87 The ICJ was not willing to make this broad 
determination because it lacked sufficient facts, including about the possible 
use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.88 The U.S. Department of Defense has 
taken the position that nuclear weapons are not inherently indiscriminate.89 A 
distinction analysis would consider the weapon’s strength, the manner in which 
it distributes its yield, and the potential radius of radiation. Any nuclear strike 
would create a high risk of a distinction violation.
Proportionality Requirement. This IHL principle prohibits launching an 
attack—even against a legitimate military objective—in which incidental harm 
to civilians would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.90 
The proportionality principle obligates parties to refrain from such attacks and 
“take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and 
other persons and objects protected from being made the object of attack.”91 An attack is illegal if it would 
kill or injure civilians to a degree that is disproportionate to its advantage. 
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The challenges that the proportionality principle present for a contemplated nuclear strike are obvious if the 
attack is planned anywhere near a civilian population. The initial blast that accompanies a nuclear attack 
would kill large numbers of civilians in the area. The radiation would cause death and disease for years to 
come. Thus, it is difficult to imagine a nuclear attack near civilians that would not violate the proportionality 
principle, particularly if conventional weapons are available that would achieve a similar military objective. 
The proportionality analysis might shift, however, if the nuclear weapon in question had a sufficiently low 
yield that its overall impact would cause less harm to civilians than available 
conventional weapons that were suited to the task. 
Avoidance of Unnecessary Suffering. “The use of means and methods of warfare 
which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is 
prohibited.”92 IHL recognizes that injury and suffering will occur, but it prohibits 
causing unnecessary suffering. Again, the characteristics of a nuclear strike and 
the potential for long-term illness and death caused by cancer and other radiation-
related diseases make this prohibition difficult to address. This is particularly true 
if conventional weapons are available that could accomplish similar objectives.93 
Process and Decision-Making
The internal executive branch authorities and procedures by which the United States may use nuclear weapons 
have developed over decades, primarily during the Cold War. Designed to respond to a nuclear attack in 
progress, the procedures have emphasized speed and decisiveness.94 This focus on rapid decision-making 
is critical when minutes count but not as important when more time is available. In that circumstance, a 
process that provides the president ample opportunity for input—including legal advice—and deliberation 
is preferable. 
Although the precise details of the nuclear launch system—known as the Nuclear Command Control 
System (NCCS)95—remain highly classified,96 the general contours can be understood from the work of 
scholars and accounts of those familiar with the process, including former Minuteman crew members. The 
NCCS process has two phases: (1) preplanning and advice, and (2) decision and execution. The first phase 
involves a continuous process of developing and reviewing options, including conducting legal review. 
Before any decision to launch, the president has an opportunity to consult advisers, if he chooses to do so, 
although there is no requirement or formal structure for that consultation. 
The final decision to launch is in the president’s hands alone and cannot be overruled.97 Once the president 
decides to launch, a more structured and automatic process begins. An Emergency Action Team, which 
includes at least one senior military official, will receive the president’s decision and translate it into an order 
to be communicated to combat crews. This is the final step before a launch. 
Preplanning Nuclear Launch Options 
The policies and procedures for a nuclear launch are designed to ensure that, if deterrence fails, the United 
States “has both the capability . . . and national resolve . . . to respond effectively to any contingency.”98 
Since the Truman administration, presidents have issued guidance related to the use of nuclear weapons.99 
The final decision 
to launch is in the 
president’s hands 
alone and cannot be 
overruled.
NTI Paper 14 www.nti.org
The President and Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, and Process
Each administration also reviews nuclear readiness and policy objectives through a Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR).100 Within each administration, the secretary of defense, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
combatant commanders, works to clarify contingency plans for potential employment of nuclear weapons. 
Contingency planning gives the president a range of numbered-plan options spanning a diverse set of 
potential attack scenarios, allowing him to choose between attacks of different scales.101 This preplanning 
process is a critical opportunity to subject plans to rigorous review and debate 
without the pressure of a developing crisis. Essential to the preplanning process is 
a legal review. The legal review seeks to ensure that all options ultimately presented 
to the president offer conventional alternatives and otherwise seeks to ensure—to 
the extent possible without knowing the exact context of a proposed strike—the 
options’ compliance with international humanitarian law.102 
During a recent congressional hearing, experts distinguished a scenario in which 
“the military wakes up the president” from one in which the “president wakes 
the military up.”103 The first scenario (called the launch-under-attack scenario), 
in which the military wakes the president, is the one for which the current 
procedures were primarily designed. In this scenario, the United States is under 
nuclear attack. The second scenario, as discussed in previous sections, involves 
a first use of nuclear weapons, in which the United States engages in a nuclear 
strike without first being the subject of a nuclear attack. The president “wakes the 
military up” because there is no immediate nuclear threat. In this situation, there 
is presumably more time for deliberation. Nuclear first use has generally been 
considered unlikely in the years since the Cold War,104 but no law or executive 
branch policy prohibits it.105 
Launch Under Attack 
A launch-under-attack scenario would begin with the detection of inbound 
missiles or bombers. The early warning detection system is designed to “provide 
‘unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely, survivable and enduring’ warning 
about attacks on the United States.”106 An alert would likely originate with North 
American Aerospace Defense Command.107 The early warning staff is required to conduct a preliminary 
assessment to evaluate the validity of the threat. If the threat is evaluated at “medium or high confidence,”108 
the president is notified. The president then receives information on the pending attack from his top military 
advisers and is presented with options for a response and an opportunity to receive advice from civilian and 
military personnel.109 During a launch under attack, however, the time available to confer would be limited 
because speed is a top priority.110 Experts estimate that the president would have less than ten minutes to 
deliberate in launch-under-attack conditions.111
If a decision is made to launch, the president (or the person acting with his authority)112 issues a launch 
order to the Pentagon and to United States Strategic Command.113 To issue the order, the president accesses 
information contained in the “nuclear football,” a briefcase that always travels with the president, carried by 
an active duty military officer.114 The briefcase contains an array of plans developed in advance, from which 
the president selects the most appropriate option. Once the president has chosen a launch option, the order 
is transmitted to the nuclear forces via an Emergency Action Team, most likely stationed at the Pentagon.115 
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To be transmitted successfully, the order must survive two-person verification. It is a common misconception 
that two-person verification is required to approve a launch order. The verification process is not a substantive 
review of the order; it is simply a process, using prearranged codes, to ensure that the order originated with 
the president himself.116 Once the president communicates the launch order and the Pentagon verifies his 
identity, the Pentagon transmits the order to the components of the nuclear triad—land-based, submarine, 
and bomber platforms—through a message that is approximately “the length of a tweet.”117
During execution of the launch, United States Strategic Command is responsible 
for the “implementation of the nuclear launch order.”118 The verified order goes 
to five land-based crews and at least one submarine crew, who then begin their 
own verification process. During this time, bombers also prepare to launch with 
a nuclear payload. The land-based Minuteman crews, once they have received 
a launch order, use the “sealed-authentication system” (SAS) codes (prepared 
by the National Security Agency) and compare the SAS codes with the order 
to authenticate.119 Crews then enter the launch plan into the weapons system, 
retrieve the launch keys, and enter additional codes to unlock the missiles. At the 
time dictated by the original launch plan, the crews turn the keys to transmit the 
plan to the missiles.120 At the turn of the key, crews transmit a “vote.” When the 
missile system receives two “votes,” the launch initiates.121 This means that, even 
if three crews were unwilling or unable to vote, the launch order would still be 
executed upon the action of the two remaining crews. This redundancy ensures 
that, even if three launch crews were destroyed in an initial attack, the United 
States would maintain its ability to respond. Aboard a submarine, the missile will 
launch when the captain, executive officer, and two crew members authenticate 
the message. Land-based missiles launch within two minutes from the time the 
initial order is issued.122 Submarine-based missiles take about fifteen minutes.123 
Once missiles have launched, there is no way to recall the weapons or disarm 
them in flight. 124
First-Use Launch 
If a president is considering a first use of nuclear weapons, the initial process for decision-making could 
provide more opportunity for deliberation and consultation than when the nation is under nuclear attack. 
Not all first-use launch scenarios are the same. The term first use is typically associated with a “sunny 
day” scenario involving a decision by the United States to initiate a conflict, perhaps to preempt a nuclear 
threat, but first use could also occur in response to a conventional attack or as an escalation of ongoing 
non-nuclear hostilities. The typical process for deliberation on national security decisions is through the 
National Security Council. The president convenes his key national security wadvisers, including at least 
the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of 
national intelligence, and the national security adviser.125 Typically, this process provides an opportunity 
for legal advice through what is known as the Lawyers Group,126 which includes the senior lawyers from 
the key national security departments and agencies. There is no guarantee, however, that a president will 
use this process when deciding about the use of a nuclear weapon. The president alone decides how he 
receives advice. The president might choose a different process with more limited participants—perhaps 
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including lawyers, perhaps not—for discussion of a matter this sensitive. Thus, although the opportunity 
for deliberation and legal advice exists at this stage, it depends on the president’s commitment to such a 
process. If the president decides to launch a nuclear strike, with or without consultation and advice, the 
process would carry on in the manner described for a launch under attack, but without the time pressures 
associated with that scenario. 
The United States has never adopted a “no first use” policy—in large part because 
of the deterrent effect created by the availability of a first-use option. The United 
States has been circumspect, however, in the way it describes the circumstances in 
which nuclear force would be appropriate. Specifically, the United States has stated 
that it will employ nuclear weapons only under “extreme circumstances to defend 
the vital interests of the United State, its allies, and partners.”127 This was the policy 
of the Obama administration and was adopted by the Trump administration in its 
first NPR.128 However, there are some significant, if subtle, differences in how the 
NPRs of these two administrations defined “extreme circumstances.” 
Protections against Illegal Strike Orders
As discussed in the previous sections, there are some circumstances under which 
a president’s order to launch a nuclear weapon would violate U.S. or international 
law. An important question about the process for making such a momentous 
decision is whether there are sufficient checks to allow a president or his advisers 
to identify and prevent an illegal nuclear strike. 
Opportunity for Legal Advice 
To protect against illegal orders, there must be a realistic opportunity for lawyers 
to review a strike and determine its legality. In the processes previously described, 
military and civilian lawyers from the Department of Defense provide legal advice 
during the preplanning of nuclear launch options. At that stage, lawyers presumably 
can eliminate certain options that would be illegal under any circumstance. They 
might determine, for example, that a certain weapon is inherently indiscriminate or that a proposed target 
has no military objective, thus eliminating the weapon or target from consideration. Some legal analysis, 
however, requires an understanding of the circumstances of a proposed strike. Determinations of military 
necessity, proportionality, and unnecessary human suffering all involve a balancing that requires knowledge 
of the threat and circumstances on the ground at the time of the launch decision. Constitutional questions 
about the need for authorization and questions of ad bellum legality under international law are also 
dependent on the facts at the time of decision and would require the involvement of lawyers outside the 
Department of Defense. 
As noted, it is possible—although not necessary—that a decision about a first use of nuclear weapons would 
run through the traditional National Security Council process and could, therefore, receive a thorough 
legal review by the Lawyers Group. In a launch under attack—or a first use in which a president opts for 
a truncated decision-making process—the opportunity for predecisional legal advice would be minimal. 
After a president decides, the process of executing his order is largely automatic. In the case of a first use, 
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however, when there may be less time pressure, an officer on an Emergency Action Team could have an 
opportunity to engage more senior officers and lawyers if there is reason for concern.
The Duty to Disobey Unlawful Orders 
Members of the armed forces are bound to follow orders of their superior 
officers.129 This duty of obedience, however, applies only to “lawful orders.”130 Thus, 
service members are obligated to refuse orders that are “manifestly” or “patently” 
illegal.131 The genesis of this obligation is international law’s rejection of the defense 
of “following superior orders.”132 The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, for 
example, explicitly precluded a superior-orders defense in its proceedings,133 and 
subsequent international criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal 
Court, have done the same.134 U.S. case law has also adopted the principle,135 and 
it is clear that U.S. service members can be criminally prosecuted or held civilly 
liable if their compliance with an order violates the law.136
Although the requirement to disobey unlawful orders is clear, how to identify 
such an order is less so. It is not enough that an order be legally debatable or 
questionable. The requirement of obedience to superior orders is critical to the 
proper functioning of military command.137 To allow—even require—legal debate 
about a broad range of orders would be destructive of good order and discipline. 
That is why the duty to disobey applies only to “manifestly” or “patently” illegal 
orders. The obligation extends only to orders that are illegal on their face; there 
should be no ability to debate the legal question.138
Legal issues on matters of force are often complex and difficult. Members of 
an Emergency Action Team receiving a presidential order most likely will lack 
sufficient information to assess the legality of an attack. It is unlikely, for example, 
that the failure to obtain congressional authorization for a use of force involving 
a nuclear weapon would be considered “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. Military 
officers, or even their lawyers, would have little background on those issues, and 
even experts hold conflicting views on the subject. Similarly, whether a use of 
force can be considered a response to an imminent armed attack for purposes of satisfying the UN Charter’s 
jus ad bellum requirements for resort to force is a subject that is often contested among countries and within 
the U.S. legal community. The answer would be no more clear to a service member reacting to a launch 
order. 
There are circumstances, however, in which an order to use a nuclear weapon—particularly if the order 
involves a first use of such a weapon—would be “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. Context is important, but, 
for example, an order for a nuclear strike targeting a civilian population center that would not provide a 
direct military advantage would be “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. Similarly, an order to strike a military 
target in an urban or other densely populated setting—particularly when a conventional weapon that is less 
devastating to civilians would suffice—would be “manifestly” disproportionate and would satisfy even the 
rigorous standard for the duty to disobey. 
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Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the launch process could make it difficult for anyone in the 
operational chain to reach a determination about manifest illegality because it is designed to move quickly 
and relatively automatically after a presidential decision. Furthermore, those in the process might assume 
that legal concerns had been resolved in advance of a launch, during the development of numbered plans. 
Even if a military officer is convinced of a launch’s illegality and decides to disobey the president, it is 
not clear whether or how that would halt a launch. Recently, current and former commanders of United 
States Strategic Command have stated that they would oppose an illegal nuclear strike order and notify the 
president of their concerns.139 Neither commander suggested that his decision would necessarily stop the 
launch.140 Some experts argue that there would be inadequate time to halt an illegal order.141
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The constant “nuclear anxiety”142 of the Cold War, coupled with the sudden assassination of President 
John F. Kennedy, prompted the 89th Congress to address gaps left by the Presidential Succession Act of 
1947.143 As then former vice president Richard Nixon explained, “[w]ith the advent of the terrible and 
instant destructive power of atomic weapons, the nation cannot afford to have any period of time when 
there is doubt or legal quibbling as to where the ultimate power to use those weapons resides.”144 The result 
of congressional action, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967,145 provides procedures for vice 
presidential succession and for scenarios in which the president is disabled,146 thereby ensuring “continuity 
of executive authority.”147
Section 4148 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is the provision most often raised during discussions about 
nuclear launch authority as it relates to presidential disability.149 Section 4150 provides that, if the president 
is no longer able to perform the duties of the office,151 the vice president, the cabinet, and Congress have 
the ability to transfer power from the president to the vice president.152 There is no clear standard for 
defining “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”153 Such a determination would be left 
to the vice president and members of the cabinet.154 Proceedings under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
would begin when the vice president and a majority of the principal cabinet members155 notify Congress 
of the president’s inability to perform his duties.156 Upon notification of Congress, executive authority is 
transferred immediately to the vice president.157 In response, the president may convey to Congress that “no 
inability exists,” at which time he “resumes the powers and duties of his office.”158 The vice president, again 
with a majority of the cabinet, may then notify Congress that the incapacity remains, in which case the 
vice president would retain the powers of the presidency until a vote by both houses. A decision to transfer 
power to the vice president requires a two-thirds vote of both the House and the Senate.159
As previously discussed, particularly in a launch-under-attack scenario, the nuclear launch decision process 
can move extremely quickly. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s removal procedures are cumbersome and 
would not provide an expedient solution to presidential disability in a launch-under-attack scenario. 
However, if an infirm president were considering a preemptive nuclear strike that his advisers considered 
reckless, or worse, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could provide a route to a transfer of power. 
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Conclusion
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the president has significant authority and flexibility on decisions about use of nuclear weapons. There are some legal limits to his authority, however. 
If the president were to consider a first use of nuclear weapons, precedent within the executive branch 
would require in some cases that he first seek congressional authorization. In addition, requirements of 
international humanitarian law raise significant—in some cases insurmountable—legal hurdles for many 
potential uses of nuclear weapons. What is not clear is whether the current procedures for reaching decisions 
on a nuclear launch are adequate to ensure that these legal requirements will be considered or that the 
president’s advisers will have the opportunity to protect against an illegal strike order.
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